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  WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
SMOKING, TIME PREFERENCE, AND WAGE 
DYNAMICS
Lalith Munasinghe




I’d like to stop smoking. I have smoked for about 15 years. I was a dancer, 
and all dancers smoke, it’s the most bizarre thing.  Newark Star-Ledger, 
January 1, 1998.
INTRODUCTION
The title of our paper “Why Do Dancers Smoke?” suggests a paradox. Dancers 
place great importance on physical health, strength, and ﬁ  tness; and yet, smoking 
leads to untoward health, loss of strength, and diminished ﬁ  tness. We contend that 
the concept of time preference, or, in the economic parlance, of individual discount 
rates – i.e. the variation in individual valuations of present versus future consump-
tion – resolves this apparent paradox. Both activities sacriﬁ  ce some distant beneﬁ  t 
for a more present-oriented gratiﬁ  cation. Dancers are passionate, if not obsessed, 
with their work; but their careers are short with dim, if not non-existent, prospects 
of future earnings. Even more obvious is the fact that smokers sacriﬁ  ce future health 
for an immediate source of pleasure. Hence the answer we consider is that dancers 
smoke because they are more present-oriented.1 
The focus of the paper is on smoking and wage dynamics. Our main objective is 
to ﬁ  rst empirically assess the correlation between smoking and wage growth over the 
life cycle, and second, to ask whether the estimated correlation between smoking and 
wage dynamics is consistent with the above time preference argument. Admittedly, 
our analysis of smoking and wage growth does not focus on dancers per se, and the 
intention of the opening paragraph is simply to motivate the hypothesis that individual 
discount rates may be a potentially important source of the observed differences in 
wage growth prospects among careers. Hence we need to address two key questions. 
First, what are the correlations between smoking and wage dynamics? Second, is 
smoking a reasonable proxy for an individual’s discount rate?596 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Smokers in the U.S. earn substantially less than non-smokers. For example, 
Levine et al. [1997], using the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY), ﬁ  nd 
that smokers earn 11 percent and 17 percent less than non-smokers in 1984 and 1991, 
respectively. After controlling for a host of individual and family characteristics, this 
wage gap reduces to 4.2 percent and 6.9 percent.2 Using the same NLSY data, we ﬁ  nd 
that the major source of this wage gap is the dramatic difference in wage growth rates 
between smokers and non-smokers. To preview our main ﬁ  ndings: smokers have lower 
wages at the time they ﬁ  rst enter the labor market compared to their non-smoking 
counterparts. And more strikingly, smokers also experience substantially lower wage 
growth over the ﬁ  rst decade of their careers. 
These differences in wage dynamics across smokers and non-smokers raise 
the interesting interpretive question about the possible direct and indirect causal 
mechanisms that may account for the observed correlations between smoking and 
wage dynamics. The evidence based on a detailed empirical analysis fails to reject the 
hypothesis that smokers are more likely to be present-oriented than their non-smoker 
counterparts, and hence our ﬁ  ndings suggest that individual discount rates may play 
a signiﬁ  cant role in career choice, investment in human capital, and, subsequently, 
differences in wage growth rates across individuals.
The idea that smoking is a proxy for discount rates is extensively documented in 
the economics literature [Fuchs, 1982]. Empirical studies ﬁ  nd correlations between 
smoking and various other behaviors related to future outcomes, including health 
status, educational attainment, earnings levels, use of seat belts, physical exercise, 
and brushing and ﬂ  ossing teeth [Hersch and Viscusi, 1990; Hersch, 1996; Levine et. 
al., 1997; Hersch, 2000; Viscusi and Hersch, 2001].3 Our paper contributes to this 
literature by studying the role of time preference in predicting human capital invest-
ments, and thus, individual wage dynamics, a topic that has received little, if any, 
attention so far. In addition, our ﬁ  nding of a strong negative correlation between 
smoking and wage growth may be relevant to the literature that shows a correlation 
between health and income among adults [Smith, 1999]. If individual discounting is 
causally linked to investments in health and investments in human capital (on the 
job) that enhance wage growth, then the positive correlation between health and 
income levels should become stronger with age since the beneﬁ  ts (and costs) of these 
investments (or lack of) materialize only later in life.4 
One of the major challenges to any discounting hypothesis is the fact that indi-
vidual discount rates are inherently unobservable. For example, in economics the 
discount rate is a conceptual device – an abstraction, if you will – that we use to ag-
gregate beneﬁ  ts and costs that accrue over time. As such, the discount rate is not a 
fact but rather a plausible presumption that individuals are likely to differ in terms 
of their relative valuation of present versus future consumption. As a consequence, 
the purported link between smoking and discount rates can be challenged by a variety 
of alternative hypotheses that can also claim to account for the observed correlations 
between smoking and wage dynamics. Hence our empirical strategy is to explicitly 
test an exhaustive list of plausible but alternative explanations. Note that any such 
hypothesis must be on an omitted variable that is not only correlated with smoking but 
also more closely linked to workers’ productivity and earnings. The obvious strategy, 
therefore, is to include a rich set of control variables – that represent the alternative 597 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
hypotheses – and test for the importance and signiﬁ  cance of the net correlations be-
tween smoking and wage dynamics. 
Although we include a host of control variables in our regression analyses, this 
approach has two caveats that should be noted. First, some of these control variables 
are also likely to be correlated with time preference, and to the extent they are, the 
estimated net smoking effects should be interpreted as a lower bound of the effects 
of individual discounting. Second, since the discount rate is unobservable it is always 
possible to claim that the observed net correlations are due to yet “another” unob-
served, or, even worse, unobservable individual characteristic. Of course, to qualify 
as a genuinely distinct hypothesis this omitted variable must be uncorrelated with 
discounting. These considerations and caveats guide the selection of control variables 
and our interpretation of the empirical ﬁ  ndings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss 
various theoretical linkages between wage dynamics, time preference, and smoking. 
In the second section, we present our empirical results and discuss our ﬁ  ndings. The 
ﬁ  nal section concludes and that is followed by a data appendix.
SMOKING AND WAGE DYNAMICS: CONCEPTUAL LINKS
In this section we consider various explanations for the observed correlation 
between smoking and wage dynamics. In Figure 1 we attempt to highlight some 
key factors and their inter-relationships with smoking and wage dynamics, includ-
ing time preference and education. We begin with the discounting hypothesis and 
then continue to discuss various alternative hypotheses that might also explain the 
observed correlation between smoking and wage dynamics, including learning and 
education, among others.
Discounting. Although our paper does not present a theory of time preference, in 
Figure 1 we list some possible determinants of individual time preference since some 
of these factors are likely to be selected as control variables. Apart from what might 
be unexplained sources of time preference, we think that background factors such as 
parental income and their educational attainments, family stability, and religious 
fervor, are likely determinants of time preference.5 
The role of individual discount rates in predicting human capital investments, 
including on-the-job training, has been widely discussed in the labor economics litera-
ture [Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1974].6 For example, Haley [1973] explicitly states: “The 
rate of discount will be inversely related to the time spent specializing. This result 
makes eminently good sense. The higher the discount rate, the less value an individual 
places on future dollars relative to present dollars. The individual with the relatively 
higher discount rate will be less inclined to forego present income for investment 
purposes than would the individual with a relatively low discount rate. Therefore, if 
all other parameters are the same, the individual with the higher discount rate will 
stop specializing in the production of human capital sooner than the individual with 
a lower discount rate” (page 938). 
This human capital investment framework is ideally suited to study the effects of 
time preference on various aspects of wage dynamics. If individuals with higher dis-598 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
count rates are less likely to invest in all forms of human capital then the ramiﬁ  cations 
for wages at the time of ﬁ  rst entry into the labor market (ﬁ  rst wage) and wage growth 
are straightforward. Individuals with high discount rates are likely to have lower and 
ﬂ  atter wage proﬁ  les: lower because of smaller pre-labor market human capital invest-
ments and ﬂ  atter because of smaller on-the-job human capital investments. 
 FIGURE  1
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Theories of compensation based on considerations other than human capital are 
also likely to have similar predictions. For example, workers with high discount rates 
will ﬁ  nd jobs with back-load compensation – on account of say high monitoring costs 
[Lazear, 1981] or high turnover costs [Salop and Salop, 1976] – less attractive than 
their more future oriented counterparts. The general point is that dynamic theories 
of compensation imply that individuals with higher discount rates are less likely to 
self-select into jobs that weigh future wages more heavily than current wages.7
Since individual discount rates are unobservable, we study their effect on wage 
dynamics by assuming that smoking is a proxy for time preference. Hence our reduced 
form hypothesis is that smokers will have lower and ﬂ  atter wage proﬁ  les. This pre-
sumed linkage between wage dynamics and smoking via time preference, however, 
must be moderated by consideration of other possible explanations for the observed 
correlations between smoking and wage dynamics. In the following we rehearse vari-
ous alternative explanations with a view to empirical testing. 
Unobserved Learning Ability. Heterogeneity of learning ability is another po-
tential explanation of the observed correlation between smoking and wage dynamics. 
For example, more efﬁ  cient (able) learners are likely to invest more in schooling as 
well as in other forms of human capital, including job training. As a consequence these 
efﬁ  cient learners will have a higher ﬁ  rst wage and a steeper wage proﬁ  le. If they are 
also less likely to smoke because their higher learning ability leads them to better 
understand the negative effects of smoking, then it is possible that this unobserved 
dimension of ability could be the culprit behind the observed negative correlations 
between smoking and wage dynamics.8 The fact that our regression results remain 599 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
robust despite the inclusion of an extraordinarily rich set of control variables related 
to ability9 strongly suggests that unobserved ability is an unlikely explanation of the 
observed differences in wage dynamics across smokers and nonsmokers.10
Education. Although we have stressed the direct effects of time preference on 
smoking and occupational choice,11 we recognize other more subtle relationships be-
tween these variables. For example, consider the various inter relationships involv-
ing education. First, although educational levels (and other forms of human capital 
investments) are likely to be directly inﬂ  uenced by an individual’s discount rate, there 
is also the possibility of reverse causality, namely, the effect of education on time 
preference.12 Second, education could also impact smoking behavior independent of 
time preference due to more efﬁ  cient transmission of information about the hazards 
of smoking among the educated [Grossman, 1972; 1975; Kenkel, 1991]. Third, the ob-
served positive correlation between education and wage growth could be due to factors 
other than discounting such as complementarities between schooling and job training 
in production technology. Hence, including education as a control variable in a wage 
growth regression requires a more nuanced interpretation of our estimates of smoking 
coefﬁ  cients. To the extent that education is correlated with smoking for reasons other 
than time preference, it should, of course, be included as a control variable. However, to 
the extent education also reﬂ  ects time preference, the estimated coefﬁ  cient on smoking 
(interpreted as a time preference effect) is likely to be biased downward.
Health. Health factors could be a direct explanation for the negative correlation 
between smoking and wage growth. Smokers are likely to be less healthy, and health 
could be a determining factor in investments in on-the-job training. 13 We attempt to 
address this potentially important factor by explicitly considering the health status 
of our respondents in the NLSY. Although the negative correlation between smoking 
and wage growth persists despite the inclusion of health status as a control variable, it 
indeed appears from our data that smokers are less healthy even in the short run. 
Class. Another alternative explanation for the correlation between earnings 
growth and smoking could be based on the sociological concept of social class hierarchy. 
The argument is that social class, independent of time preference, is a determinant of 
both smoking and occupational choice, and thus, also of wage growth. For example, the 
correlation between wage growth and smoking could be due to the fact that blue-collar 
workers smoke more (because they are blue-collar workers) and because blue-collar 
jobs are typically low wage growth jobs.14 A counter argument is Banﬁ  eld’s thesis that 
social class itself is deﬁ  ned by time preference [Banﬁ  eld, 1970]. To the extent that social 
class and time preference do not perfectly overlap, some of our control variables such 
as neighborhood income and parents education levels are likely to proxy social class. 
A related explanation could also be based on the idea that the culture of occupations 
may be more or less tolerant of smoking behavior.15 However, in our analysis this is 
unlikely to be a major cause of the correlations since we observe smoking behavior 
at a relatively early age. In Section 3.5 we provide additional evidence showing that 
smoking decisions are made at a relatively young age, based on a survey of several 
hundred College undergraduate students.
Borrowing Constraints. An argument based on borrowing constraints can also 
account for the correlations between smoking and wage dynamics. Suppose smokers 
come from relatively poor households that face credit and liquidity constraints. As a 600 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
consequence they will be less able to make investments for the future. Because smok-
ing is a proxy for family wealth and credit constraints, ﬁ  rst wage and wage growth are 
likely to be negatively correlated with smoking. We attempt to address this issue by 
including parental education levels and measures of neighborhood income as control 
variables in our regression analyses.
Risk Taking. Some studies show a positive correlation between smoking and risk 
taking [e.g., Viscusi and Hersch, 2001; Barsky et al., 1997]. However, as Shaw [1996] 
shows, “risk takers are rewarded with higher wage growth rates”. Therefore, the fact 
that we cannot directly control for risk aversion is likely to lead to a downward bias 
of our estimated smoking coefﬁ  cient. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data
Our data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY) are ideally 
suited to study the role of smoking in predicting wage dynamics. The data contain 
information about smoking behavior of the respondents in their late teens and early 
twenties. The panel nature of the data and the fact that we observe the entire early 
work histories of the vast majority of our respondents allow us to directly correlate 
smoking behavior with individual earnings over the ﬁ  rst decade or so of their careers. 
In addition, the NLSY contain rich information on a variety of individual, family, 
geographic, and work related characteristics. As a consequence, we are able to evalu-
ate a large number of alternative hypotheses by including a rich array of control 
variables in our regression analyses. In the appendix we have a detailed description 
of the NLSY data.
Wage growth measures
We estimate a variety of wage growth functions within a simple least-squares 
framework. The basic regression equation is of the form:
(1)          , α Δ= + + ii i i WS X ß μ   
where ∆W is a measure of earnings or wage growth, S is the smoking indicator, X 
is a vector of individual and other characteristics, and μ is the error term for the ith 
individual. Given the young age of the NLSY sample, we compute these wage growth 
measures for approximately the ﬁ  rst decade of labor market experience. Our construc-
tion of individual wage growth rates exploits the panel nature of the NLSY by running, 
for each individual in our sample, a simple OLS wage regression with time since ﬁ  rst 
entering the labor market as the independent variable. We interpret the time coefﬁ  cient 
as an estimate of the individual average wage growth rate and implement it as the 
dependent variable in our wage growth analyses. In the individual OLS regressions 
we specify the wage rate metric as both the real wage and its log counterpart.16 
We compute wage growth measures over long and short panels. In the long panel 
we use information over the entire observed career of each individual.17 However, in 601 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
this panel labor market spells are correlated with age and schooling levels. This leads 
to biased estimates of wage growth rates since wage increases are more rapid in the 
early part of careers. For example, if we observe a shorter period of labor market ex-
perience for more educated groups we are likely to over estimate their wage growth 
rates. To address such concerns we construct wage growth measures from a panel that 
is restricted to the ﬁ  rst six years of labor market experience. We also create a second 
short panel by further restricting it to only those with contiguous wage observations 
in the ﬁ  rst six years of their careers.18
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents smoking rates (reported in 1984) for a select group of occupations. 
In our entire sample 38 percent were classiﬁ  ed as smokers in 1984.19 The variation 
in this gross smoking rate is quite dramatic with “Maids and Housemen” at the high 
end with a smoking rate of 62 percent, and “Teachers in Elementary Schools” at the 
low end with less than 10 percent. These rates are comparable to estimates found in 
other studies.20 
 TABLE  1
  Smoking Rates by Select Occupations1
 NLSY  1984
Occupation Smoking  Rate  Observations
All .376  9,501
Maids and Housemen  .621   66
Roofers .600  40
Kitchen workers  .566  53
Waiters   .554  233
Heavy truck drivers  .509  106
Laborers and Construction  .476  504
Carpenters .451  82
Janitors and Cleaners  .413  305
Housekeepers and Butlers  .386  171
Truck drivers (light)  .365  126
Teachers (n.e.c.)2 .349  43
Cashiers .348  391
Sales workers, other commodities  .325  351
Secretaries .283  297
Athletes .226  31
Computer Programmers  .208  101
Teachers, elementary schools  .094  53
1 Occupations are randomly selected across the spectrum of smoking rates with the exception that we omit 
occupations with very low sample sizes.
2 Not elsewhere classiﬁ  ed
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for smokers and non-smokers. These 
gross mean characteristics are strikingly different. For example, educational attain-
ment is substantially higher among non-smokers.21 Non-smokers, on average, have 
over one and a quarter more years of completed schooling, are much more likely to 
have a high school diploma, and score about 10 points higher on the Armed Forces 
Qualifying Tests (AFQT). The differences in labor market outcomes are even more 602 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
dramatic. Smokers enter the labor market earlier than non-smokers due to their lower 
level of schooling, thus their higher level of potential market experience. However, 
non-smokers have more “net” labor market experience, lower turnover rates, and earn 
more than smokers22. Not surprisingly, a relatively smaller percent of non-smokers 
report health as a limiting factor to the amount and kind of work they could do.23
  TABLE 2
  Descriptive Statistics across Smokers and Non-smokers
 NLSY  1979-1994
 Non-Smokers  Smokers
Age (in 1984)  23.49  23.66
Non white  .43  .37
Sex (% males)  .49  .54
Married .44  .38
Schooling 13.3  11.9
High School Diploma  .86  .66
Afqt89 45.3  34.7
Father’s schooling  9.7  9.1
Mother’s schooling  10.4  9.9
Health limit kind of work  .035  .045
Net years of experience (in 1994)*  11.5  10.4
Potential years of experience (in 1994)*  14.1  15.8
First wage (real)  5.91  5.55
First wage (nominal)  4.77  4.36
Hourly (nominal) pay (79-94)  13.29  11.54
Changed employer since last interview (79-94)  .354  .431
Quit job (79-94)  .245  .288
Was laid-off (79-94)  .068  .086
Was ﬁ  red (79-94)  .016  .031
Increases in hourly wages (nominal)  .67  .49
Increases in hourly wages (in 1987 dollars)  .34  .21
 First six years in the labor market  .39  .23
 First six years, no missing observations  .44  .32
Increases in log hourly wages (in 1987 dollars)  .037  .025
 First six years in the labor market  .050  .031
 First six years, no missing observations  .057  .044
* “Net” refers to actual years of experience, while “potential” experience is calculated as (age-schooling-6). 
Number of observation varies across variables. For ﬁ  xed individual characteristics the number is about 
6700, and for means taken over the whole 79-94 period, the number is about 50,000 valid observations.
All mean differences are signiﬁ  cantly different from zero, using 99 percent conﬁ  dence level (the t-test 
was performed assuming equal variance).
The gross hourly pay is substantially lower for smokers compared to non-smokers. 
On average, the non-smoker wage premium is over 15 percent. The differences in ﬁ  rst 
wage and wage growth rates provide further insight into the overall wage disparity 
between smokers and non-smokers. The mean ﬁ  rst wage is lower for smokers, but 
this difference (7 percent) is not as substantial as the difference in overall wages. 
However, the substantial difference in the increases in hourly wages (.34 versus .21) 603 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
represents a huge wage growth premium of over 60 percent between smokers and 
non-smokers, and thus suggests that wage growth differentials are largely responsible 
for the well-documented fact that smokers earn less than non-smokers.24
REGRESSIONS RESULTS
First wage and smoking
Table 3 reports OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is 
the reported wage at the time the individual ﬁ  rst enters the labor market (ﬁ  rst wage). 
The numbers in the table show only the coefﬁ  cients of the smoking variable under 
various model speciﬁ  cations. First wages are about forty cents lower for smokers. 
This represents a 4.7 percent initial wage gap between smokers and non-smokers. 
This wage gap reduces by half after controlling for a rich set of individual and fam-
ily characteristics.25 As we argued earlier, this estimated difference in ﬁ  rst wages is 
consistent with the time preference hypothesis that smokers, because they are more 
present oriented, are likely to invest less in both observed and unobserved pre-market 
human capital, and thus experience lower ﬁ  rst wages. We now turn to our analyses 
of the correlations between smoking and wage growth rates. 
 TABLE  3
  First Wage Regressions
  OLS Smoking Coefﬁ  cients
  (Standard Errors are in parentheses)
  Sample: Long panel1
  Real Wage  Log Real Wage
No Controls  -0.404  -0.047
 (0.081)  (0.005)
Limited Controls2 -0.209  -0.022
 (0.084)  (0.008)
Full Controls3 -0.213  -0.024
 (0.084)  (0.008)
1. Includes the ﬁ  rst wage of our long panel sample.
2. Limited Controls include age, race, sex, schooling, and AFQT scores. 
3. Full Controls include in addition to the above also health status, measure of average neighborhood 
income, and religious afﬁ  liation. See Notes to Table 4 and the Data Appendix for more details.
 
 Wage growth and smoking
Tables 4 through 6 present regression results on the partial correlation between 
wage growth and smoking. Although we report only the coefﬁ  cient on smoking, the 
numerous estimates we present reﬂ  ect different data samples, wage metrics, and the 
addition of more control variables. The two columns in each table show estimates from 
regressions using two different wage growth metrics based on dollar wages and log 
wages, respectively. The numbers going down the rows are smoking coefﬁ  cients from 
regression speciﬁ  cations that cumulatively add more control variables. Note that in 
our ﬁ  rst row the only variable, in addition to smoking, is the ﬁ  rst wage.26 Finally, 
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panels, respectively. In Appendix Table 1 we report the full regression results for two 
of the models presented in Table 4.
The striking ﬁ  nding across the various wage growth metrics and model speciﬁ  ca-
tions is the negative and signiﬁ  cant correlation between smoking and wage growth. 
This result is robust to the inclusion of many control variables. The negative correlation 
between smoking and wage growth increases somewhat after controlling for age, race, 
and gender. Unsurprisingly, including completed years of schooling in wage growth 
regressions reduces this negative correlation substantially. Note, however, that the 
net effect of smoking still remains signiﬁ  cant across all speciﬁ  cations. Including AFQT 
scores as a proxy for unobserved characteristics such as intelligence, schooling qual-
ity, and skills learned at home,27 leads to a further reduction of the negative effect of 
smoking. However, the negative smoking coefﬁ  cient remains large and signiﬁ  cant.28
In Section 2.2 we discussed a variety of alternative explanations and the possible 
inclusion of certain control variables as a means of evaluating the predictive power 
of these hypotheses. Our ﬁ  nding that the inclusion of schooling reduces the smoking 
coefﬁ  cient substantially raises an interpretive question. To the extent that schooling 
and smoking are correlated for reasons quite apart from time preference, the reduced 
impact of smoking on wage growth should be interpreted as an unbiased estimate of 
time preference. However, to the extent that the correlation between schooling and 
smoking is due to time preference, this estimated coefﬁ  cient should be interpreted 
as a lower bound of the time preference effect. Similar considerations apply to the 
inclusion of AFQT scores as a control variable.
 
 TABLE  4
  Wage Growth Regressions
  OLS Smoking Coefﬁ  cients
  (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
  Sample: Long panel1
  Wage growth measures based on
     (i)  Real  wage   (ii)  Log  of  real  wage
Cumulative Controls2
1. First Real Wage  -.158  -.0152   
 (.017)  (.0018)
2. Sex, Race & Age  -.179  -.0173
 (.017)  (.0018)
3. Schooling  -.059  -.0053 
 (.018)  (.0019)
4. AFQT  -.048  -.0043
 (.018)  (.0019) 
5. Health, Neighborhood  -.052  -.0048
    Income, Religion  (.018)  (.0019)
1. Long panel refers to the sample of wage growth measures computed over the entire observed careers of 
our NLSY respondents.
2. Control variables: First real wage (and the log of ﬁ  rst real wage in the second column), gender, race 
(nonwhite versus white), age, six schooling categories, AFQT scores, health status, average per capital 
neighborhood income, religion afﬁ  liation, and frequency of attendance of religious services. See the Data 
Appendix for a more detailed description of all variables.605 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
 Table  5
  Wage Growth Regressions
  OLS Smoking Coefﬁ  cients
  (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
  Sample: Short panel1
  Wage growth measures based on
     (i)  Real  wage   (ii)  Log  of  real  wage
Cumulative Controls2
1. First Real Wage  -.209  -.0245
 (.024)  (.0027)
2. Sex, Race & Age  -.237  -.0280
 (.023)  (.0027)
3. Schooling  -.102  -.0124 
 (.024)  (.0028)
4. AFQT  -.087  -.0107
 (.024)  (.0028) 
5. Health, Neighborhood  -.088  -.0109
    Income, Religion  (.024)  (.0028)
1. Short panel refers to the sample of wage growth measures computed over the ﬁ  rst six years since enter-
ing the labor market.
2. Control variables: First real wage (and the log of ﬁ  rst real wage in the second column), gender, race 
(nonwhite versus white), age, six schooling categories, AFQT scores, health status, average per capital 
neighborhood income, religion afﬁ  liation, and frequency of attendance of religious services. See the Data 
Appendix for a more detailed description of all variables.
 TABLE  6
  Wage Growth Regressions
  OLS Smoking Coefﬁ  cients
  (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
  Sample: Short-Continuous panel1
  Wage growth measures based on
     (i)  Real  wage   (ii)  Log  of  real  wage
Cumulative Controls2
1. First Wage  -.188  -.0191   
 (.023)  (.0022)
2. Sex, Race & Age  -.212  -.0212
 (.023)  (.0022)
3. Schooling  -.079  -.0078 
 (.023)  (.0022)
4. AFQT  -.063  -.0062
 (.023)  (.0022) 
5. Health, Neighborhood  -.067  -.0067
    Income, Religion  (.023)  (.0022)
1. Short-Continuous panel refers to the sample of wage growth measures computed over the ﬁ  rst six years 
since entering the labor market without any missing observations.
2. Control variables: First real wage (and the log of ﬁ  rst real wage in the second column), gender, race 
(nonwhite versus white), age, six schooling categories, AFQT scores, health status, average per capital 
neighborhood income, religion afﬁ  liation, and frequency of attendance of religious services. See the Data 
Appendix for a more detailed description of all variables.606 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  7
  Wage growth differences between non-smokers and smokers
  Real dollar differences  Real percentage differences
  Gross Net  Gross Net
Sample restrictions
Long panel  62%  24%  48%  20%
Short panel  67%  38%  58%  35%
Short-Continuous panel  38%  21%  31%  15%
The above numbers represent the differences in wage growth between non-smokers and smokers as a 
percent of the mean wage growth of smokers. In the “Gross” column, the numerator is the difference in 
sample means (of wage growth) between non-smokers and smokers while the denominator is the mean value 
for smokers (see Table 2). In the “Net” column the numerator is the regression coefﬁ  cient of the smoking 
dummy variable, (see tables 4-6) while the denominator is the mean value for smokers (see Table 2). The 
three rows represent data from the different sample restrictions we impose.
We also identiﬁ  ed a variety of other potentially important control variables. The 
hypothesis that budget constraints of poor households limit their access to human 
capital investments coupled with the fact that the poor are more likely to smoke sug-
gested the inclusion of household income as a test of this hypothesis. Since we do not 
have income information of parents of NLSY respondents, we constructed a “neighbor-
hood” income variable using census data from 1980 on the basis of race and education 
level of parents. Although this average neighborhood income variable is positively 
correlated with wage growth, our smoking coefﬁ  cients remain highly robust.29 In fact 
the inclusion of a host of other variables (in the last row of each table), such as health 
status, religious afﬁ  liation and frequency of attendance of religious service, barely 
changes the coefﬁ  cient estimate of smoking. 
In summary: the negative smoking coefﬁ  cient reduces substantially when human 
capital variables are included (education and AFQT scores); it is highly robust to a 
whole host of additional control variables; and more importantly, it remains signiﬁ  cant 
across all model speciﬁ  cations.
Next we address the question of magnitude of these wage growth differences 
between smokers and non-smokers. Table 7 shows the wage growth differentials for 
the three data samples we use in our regression analyses. Each number represents 
the mean wage growth difference between non-smokers and smokers as a percent-
age of the mean wage growth of smokers. The numerator of the “gross” columns is 
based on sample mean differentials, and the numerator of the “net” columns is based 
on the smoking coefﬁ  cient from the wage growth regression with the most extensive 
controls, including ﬁ  rst wage, completed years of schooling and AFQT scores. These 
results are presented for two wage growth metrics – real wage growth in dollar and 
percentage terms, respectively.
The striking result is the huge difference in the mean wage growth rates between 
non-smokers and smokers. Across the different sample restrictions and wage growth 
metrics, this wage growth differential varies from a low of 31 percent to a high in ex-
cess of 65 percent. Put simply, the mean annual wage growth of non-smokers is about 
50 percent higher than it is for smokers. As we predicted earlier in our discussion, 
this differential is substantially reduced when the schooling effects are netted out. 
But notice that the net effect of non-smoking on wage growth still remains sizeable 
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the real impact of discount rates on wage growth is likely to be higher than this net 
estimate via smoking since schooling (as well as other variables like AFQT scores) is 
also likely to be correlated with individual discount rates. So these “net” effects should 
be interpreted as low bound estimates of the effect of discounting on wage growth.
SURVEY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS
We conclude our empirical analysis by presenting some evidence on smoking 
and choice of college majors. Our working hypothesis is that the correlation between 
occupational choice (i.e., investment in human capital) and smoking does not reﬂ  ect 
any causal relationship. Both decisions are affected by the individual’s rate of time 
preference. An alternative hypothesis is that there is a causal relationship from oc-
cupational choice to smoking. For some reasons, working in a given occupation affects 
the likelihood of smoking. This potential problem is partially taken care of by the 
fact that the smoking information in our data is collected at a relatively young age, 
which is, in most cases, prior to entry into the labor market. In this section we report 
smoking rates across college majors. The results further support the hypothesis that 
smoking decisions are made prior to entry into the labor market and probably even 
prior to entry to college.
We administered over 400 surveys to Barnard and Columbia College undergradu-
ates in 1999. The survey contained a series of questions about smoking and other 
behaviors related to future outcomes. We also collected information on gender, college 
major, ethnicity, religious afﬁ  liation, and family background. Students from about 30 
majors were sampled. However, in our analysis we only use the top 10 majors because 
of sample size considerations. In Table 8 we present smoking rates by major. The ﬁ  rst 
column of Table 8 lists the top ten majors by sample size. The order of majors from 
top to bottom is ranked from the highest smoking rate to the lowest. The two majors 
with the highest smoking rates are Dance and English, and with the lowest smoking 
rates are Engineering and Psychology. Deﬁ  ning smokers as those smoking at least 
ﬁ  ve cigarettes per day (“Smoker 2”) leads to a single switch between the top ﬁ  ve and 
the bottom ﬁ  ve majors – History majors switch to the low end from the high end, 
and Political Science majors switch from low to high. What is striking in this table 
is the large variation in smoking rates by major – from 67 percent of Dance majors 
to just 17 percent of Psychology majors. To address the possible objection that this 
variation might be explained by the “culture” of departments or majors, we computed 
the percent of current smokers that started smoking prior to coming to College. This 
information is presented in the last column of Table 8 under the label “Prior Smoker.” 
The numbers do not show a strong pattern, except that a higher fraction of smokers 
in the Dance and English departments appear to have also started smoking prior to 
coming to College. 
Although it might be tempting to assert that Dance and English majors have poorer 
earnings prospects, we make no attempt here to present evidence about differences in 
expected future earnings across college majors. This evidence, no doubt preliminary 
and tangential, should raise some caution about the “culture” of occupation or profes-
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  Table 8
  Smoking Rates by College Majors*
  (Survey of College Majors 1999)
Major  Observations  Number of  Smoker 1  Smoker 2  Prior
   Smokers        Smoker
     (SE)  (SE)  (SE)
Dance 12  8  .67    .33  .63
     (.136)  (.136)  (.171)
English 21  10  .48  .24  .70
     (.109)  (.093)  (.145)
History 14  6  .43  .14  .33
     (.132)  (.093)  (.192)
Asian Studies  10  4  .40  .20  .25
     (.155)  (.126)  (.217)
Computer Science  11  4  .36  .18  .75
     (.145)  (.116)  (.271)
Economics 120  40  .33  .13  .43
     (.043)  (.031)  (.078)
Political Science  23  7  .30  .22  .29
     (.096)  (.086)  (.172)
Natural Science  33  8  .24  .09  .25
     (.074)  (.050)  (.153)
Engineering 45  9  .20  .11 .56
     (.060)  (.047)  (.165)
Psychology 24 4  .17  .08  1.0
     (.077)  (.055)  (0)
*  Results based on several hundred surveys of Barnard and Columbia College undergraduates.
  Only the top 10 majors are reported. Standard Errors (SE) are in parentheses and are calculated as-
suming binomial distribution.
Deﬁ  nitions
  Smoker 1: If smoke 1 or more cigarettes per day.
  Smoker 2: If smoke 5 or more cigarettes per day.
  Prior Smoker: Fraction of current smokers (Smoker 1) who started smoking prior to coming to College 
(before age 18).
CONCLUSION
We ﬁ  nd that smokers have lower and ﬂ  atter wage proﬁ  les compared to non-smok-
ers. This ﬁ  nding is robust to a variety of wage growth measures and inclusion of a 
host of control variables. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that smok-
ing is a proxy for time preference, especially given the use of an extraordinarily rich 
set of controls for heterogeneity in ability across individuals. Therefore, our ﬁ  ndings 
highlight the importance of discounting in individuals’ decision making in the labor 
market as well as in health related decisions. 
Public policy consensus highlights the importance of early education and inter-
vention. Our ﬁ  ndings suggest that such interventions should focus on inﬂ  uencing a 
child’s time preference. The factors and mechanisms that determine time preference 
should therefore be a high priority for research and public policy discussion.609 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
DATA APPENDIX: NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEYS OF YOUTH, 1979-94
Our data is from the NLSY. This is a panel of 12,686 youth, aged 14-21 in 1978, 
and sampled continuously since 1979. Our sample includes data up to 1994. We include 
individuals in our sample when they ﬁ  rst report that their “main activity’’ is “work-
ing.’’ Therefore, our “First Wage” variable is recorded accordingly. The key variable of 
our analysis is whether, in 1984, respondents answered afﬁ  rmatively to whether they 
smoked or not. We classify a smoker (in 1984) as a person who at least smoked one 
cigarette per day on average. Out of 12,584 who responded, 38.8 percent were classi-
ﬁ  ed as smokers. Similar, but not exact, questions were also asked in 1992. A smoker 
was classiﬁ  ed as someone who “smokes daily” (as opposed to “occasionally” or “not 
at all”). Of the 8,341 who responded in 1992, 28.92 percent were classiﬁ  ed as smok-
ers. We utilized only the 1984 smoking questions for the following reasons: By 1992 
the number of individuals that answered the smoking survey dropped dramatically, 
due to sample attrition. Only 7,822 individuals answered the 1992 survey and had 
valid wage growth measures. More important, the sample attrition was not random. 
Individuals who smoked in 1984 were more likely to drop out, and even worse, those 
with lower wage growth were substantially more likely to drop out.
Our principal dependent variable is a wage growth measure for each individual 
constructed over the ﬁ  rst several years in the labor market. We construct a wage 
growth coefﬁ  cient for each individual by estimating a wage regression as a function of 
time only. This estimated coefﬁ  cient is our measure of individual wage growth rates. 
For wages we use two measures of hourly payments, real wages (in 1987 dollars) 
and their natural logarithm. In an earlier version of the paper we also used nominal 
wages. Since none of our results was affected by the use of nominal wages, we limit 
the analysis here to real wages. We consider wage reports to be valid only if nominal 
pay is between $2 and $200. Given the construction of our wage growth measure, a 
minimum of two valid observations per individual is required in order to be included 
in the sample.
We construct two versions of this estimate: (1) using the longest panel of data for 
each individual, and (2) using only the ﬁ  rst 6 years in the labor market - counting 
the ﬁ  rst 6 surveys/years since entering the labor market. This allows for less than 6 
observations if individuals leave missing values in some years. 
Below we discuss the construction of several key variables used in the regressions:
“Health” – Respondents in the NLSY were asked, in each survey, the following 
two questions: (1) “hltamt” - whether health limited the amount of work you could do 
since last survey (“(are you/would you be) limited in the kind of work you (could) do 
on a job for pay because of your health?”), and (2) “hltknd” - whether health limited 
the kind of work you could do since last survey (“(are you/would you be) limited in the 
amount of work you (could) do because of your health?”). Using the answer to these 
two questions we constructed several other additional health measures: 
(1)  “evera” - if a person ever reported hltamt=1, 
(2)  “everk” - if a person ever reported hltknd=1, 
(3)  “mhlta” -  percent of times reported hltamt=1, and 610 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
(4)  “mhltk” -  percent of times reported hltknd=1. 
We experimented with all measures but report regressions’ result using “mhltk” 
only. None of the results was affected by using any of the other alternative measures 
of health.
Schooling: We use the respondents report on “highest grade completed” to construct 
six schooling dummies: 8 years or less, 9-11 years, 12 years, 13-15 years, 16 years, 
and 17+ years. We report only the results using the dummy variables. Replacing the 
schooling dummies with the continuous measure didn’t affect our results.
 AFQT Scores: During the summer and fall of 1980, NLSY79 respondents par-
ticipated in an effort of the U.S. Departments of Defense and Military Services to 
update the norms of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The 
Department of Defense and Congress, after questioning the appropriateness of us-
ing the World War II reference population as the primary basis for interpreting the 
enlistment test scores of contemporary recruits, decided in 1979 to conduct this new 
study. NLSY79 respondents were selected since they comprised a pre-existing nation-
ally representative sample of young people born during the period 1957 through 1964. 
This testing, which came to be referred to as the “Proﬁ  le of American Youth,” was 
conducted by NORC (National Organization for Research at the University of Chicago) 
representatives according to standard ASVAB procedure guidelines; respondents were 
paid $50 for their participation. Groups of ﬁ  ve to ten persons were tested at more 
than 400 test sites, including hotels, community centers, and libraries throughout the 
United States and abroad. A total of 11,914 civilian and military NLSY79 respondents 
(or 94 percent of the 1979 sample) completed this test: 5,766 or 94.4 percent of the 
cross- sectional sample, 4,990 or 94.2 percent of the supplemental sample, and 1,158 
or 90.5 percent of the military sample.
The ASVAB consists of a battery of 10 tests that measure knowledge and skill in 
the following areas: (1) general science; (2) arithmetic reasoning; (3) word knowledge; 
(4) paragraph comprehension; (5) numerical operations; (6) coding speed; (7) auto and 
shop information; (8) mathematics knowledge; (9) mechanical comprehension; and (10) 
electronics information. A composite score derived from select sections of the battery 
can be used to construct an approximate and unofﬁ  cial Armed Forces Qualiﬁ  cations 
Test score (AFQT) for each youth. The AFQT is a general measure of trainability and 
a primary criterion of enlistment eligibility for the Armed Forces. The creation of this 
percentile score, called AFQT89, involves: (1) computing a verbal composite score by 
summing word knowledge and paragraph comprehension raw scores; (2) converting 
subtest raw scores for verbal, math knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning; (3) multi-
plying the verbal standard score by two; (4) summing the standard scores for verbal, 
math knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning; and (5) converting the summed standard 
score to a percentile. 
Religion: We use two indicators for religious afﬁ  liation and frequency of attend-
ing religious services: (1) dummy variables indicating whether the person was raised 
Protestant, Baptist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, 
or Jewish. (2) The frequency in which respondents attended religious services (never, 
several times a year, about once a month, three times a month, about once a week, or 
more than once a week). In the regressions’ results reported in the paper we include 
both measures: religious afﬁ  liation and frequency of attendance. 611 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
“Neighborhood Income”: This variable is constructed using the 1980 census and 
then matched to the NLSY sample. It represents the expected value of a person’s 
neighborhood per capita income, given their race (white, black, or Hispanic), educa-
tion level (less than 8 years, 9-11 years, 12-15 years, or 16+ years), and county of 
residence.
  APPENDIX TABLE 1
  Wage Growth Regression
  OLS estimation results (standard errors in parentheses). 
  Sample: Long Panel
   Wage growth measures are based on
  (i) Real Wage    (ii) Log of Real Wage
Smoker -.052  -.0048
 (.018)  (.0019)
First Real Wage  -.084  -.0818
 (.002)  (.0026)
Sex (if male)  .197  .0220
 (.016)  (.0018)
Race (if non-white)  .030  -.0001
 (.022)  (.002)
Age in 1984  -.008  -.0015
 (.003)  (.0004)
Schooling: 9-11 years  -.024  .0028
 (.052)  (.0055)
12 years  .007  .0105
 (.050)  (.0054)
12-15 years  .110  .0226
 (.053)  (.0057)
16 years  .352  .0438
 (.058)  (.0062)
17+ years  .418  .0451
 (.062)  (.0067)
AFQT scores  .003  .0003
 (.0004)  (.00004)
Health problems  -.276  -.0358
 (.074)  (.0080)
Neighborhood income  .00003  .000003
 (.000006)  (.0000006)
Religious afﬁ  liation (excluded: Presbyterian)  -.021  .0006 
Raised Protestant  (.048)  (.0052)
Raised Baptist  -.044  -.0034
 (.035)  (.0038)
Raised Episcopalian  -.039  -.0016
 (.071)  (.0076)
Raised Lutheran  -.021  -.0027
 (.046)  (.0050)
Raised Methodist  -.036  -.0041
 (.042)  (.0045)
Raised Roman Catholic  .007  .0008
 (.003)  (.0037)
Raised Jewish  .187  -.0017
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  APPENDIX TABLE 1 (continued)
  Wage Growth Regression
  OLS estimation results (standard errors in parentheses). 
  Sample: Long Panel
   Wage growth measures are based on
  (i) Real Wage    (ii) Log of Real Wage
Raised other  -.043  -.0053
 (.040)  (.0043)
Frequency of attending services (excluded: “never”)  .040  .0007 
Several times a year  (.024)  (.0026)
About once a month  .022  .0020
 (.033)  (.0035)
Three times a month  -.014  -.0046
 (.030)  (.0033)
About once a week  .017  -.0018
 (.026)  (.0029)
More than once a week  -.004  -.0037
 (.033)  (.0036)
Constant term  .4118  .1475
 (.111)  (.012)
R2 .19  .14
Number of observations  9396  9396
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1.  Seminar participants never fail to point out the “real” reason why dancers smoke: weight control. Al-
though this answer is not inconsistent with our claim that dancers have higher discount rates, among 
120 plus professional dancers who smoke (based on a survey we conducted in New York City in 2001), 
a reason for smoking they least agree with is “weight control.” Among the reasons they most agree 
with are “relaxation” and “enjoyment.” In that survey, of over 300 professional dancers, about 40% 
were smokers, a rate substantially higher than the U.S. average for this age group. The Center for 
Disease Control reports that the average smoking rates for women and men age 18-34 (approximate 
age range in our sample) in 2000 were just shy of 25% and 29%, respectively [U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2002]. Our sample is heavily biased toward women.
2.  See Leigh and Berger [1989] for an earlier study on the effect of smoking on wages.
3.  Of course smoking is affected by a variety of factors in addition to time preference. For example, risk 
aversion, cigarette prices, parents’ behavior, and even residential location [Gruber and Zinman, 2000], 
are likely determinants of smoking. To the extent that smoking better reﬂ  ects these other factors 
vis-à-vis time preference, our assumption that smoking is a good proxy for discounting is indeed less 
sound, and thus, may lead to weaker empirical results.
4.  Smith [1999] focuses on the direct dual causation from health to wealth and from wealth to health. 
However, he alludes to a third possibility: “Or perhaps some unobserved factor makes some people 
both healthier and wealthier” (page 148). Our hypothesis is that individual discount rate is a likely 
contender of such an unobserved factor.
5.  Becker and Mulligan [1997] present a formal model of individual time preference where individual 
discount rates are viewed as an optimal choice variable given marginal costs and beneﬁ  ts of invest-
ment in activities that affect time preference.613 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
6.  By focusing on heterogeneity of time preference among individuals we sidestep various interesting and 
controversial issues related to individual discounting. For example, Loewenstein [1992] challenges 
the implicit, if not standard, notion in microeconomic theory that individuals have a unique discount 
rate for all behaviors with future consequences. Although we speak of an individual discount rate, our 
assumption is much weaker than the assumption challenged by Loewenstein. We only need to assume 
that there is a high correlation of implied individual discount rates over a limited set of behaviors. 
Another recent debate centers on the appropriate speciﬁ  cation of discounting. The issue is whether 
the standard exponential function should be replaced by a hyperbolic speciﬁ  cation (e.g. see Laibson, 
1997). For a labor market application of hyperbolic discounting see Della Vigna and Paserman [2000].   
For a critical review of hyperbolic discounting, see Rubinstein [2003].
7.  Since individual discount rates are deﬁ  ned in terms of current versus future consumption and not in 
terms of current versus future incomes, we implicitly assume that workers face borrowing constraints 
against returns on investments in human capital. It should be noted, however, that even if the capital 
market is perfect, the returns on an investment in schooling, for example, depend on hours of work if 
schooling raises market productivity by a larger percentage than it raises non-market productivity. 
Individuals who are more future-oriented desire relatively more leisure at older ages. Therefore, they 
work more at younger ages and have a higher discounted marginal beneﬁ  t on a given investment than 
persons who are more present oriented.
8.  Since the NLSY has information on a battery of ten ASVAB test scores (see data appendix for details), 
to claim that learning ability is unobserved seems somewhat tenuous. It stands to reason that at least 
some subset of these test scores will be correlated with such learning ability, and thus the inclusion 
of these test scores as independent variables in a wage growth regression should be a sufﬁ  cient test 
of the learning hypothesis.
9.  While controlling for years of schooling reduced our estimated coefﬁ  cients substantially, including 
additional controls had much smaller or no effect on our results.
10.  In another study we model wage dynamics as a function of individual discount rates and learning 
efﬁ  ciency, and derive an empirical test to address whether smoking reﬂ  ects discounting or learning 
ability. The empirical results overwhelmingly support the time preference hypothesis put forth in this 
paper [Munasinghe and Sicherman, 2005].
11. Wage  growth is an important feature of occupations, and thus a key determinant of occupational choice. 
Although occupations differ on many dimensions, our focus in this paper is on the wage growth dimen-
sion only. As a consequence we view wage growth differences as reﬂ  ecting occupational choice. 
12.  Becker and Mulligan [1997] provide the following mechanism by which schooling can reduce discount 
rates: “Schooling focuses students’ attention on the future. Schooling can communicate images of the 
situations and difﬁ  culties of adult life, which are the future of childhood and adolescence. In addi-
tion, through repeated practice at problem-solving, schooling helps children learn the art of scenario 
simulation” (pp. 735-736).
13.  The Becker-Mulligan framework suggests alternative interpretations of links between time prefer-
ence and other outcomes such as health status. While Fuchs [1982] argues that differences in time 
preference explain differences in health related decisions and outcomes, Becker and Mulligan argue 
for reverse causality: People in better health are more likely to invest in activities that reduce their 
discount rate (because they expect to live longer). Of course exogenous events may also affect time 
preference. For example, Hersch [2000] ﬁ  nds that the presence of young children reduces smoking 
especially among women. Similarly, familiarity with life circumstances of older family members may 
lead to a more vivid and tangible picture of what one’s own future beckons, and hence to a higher 
valuation of future outcomes.
14.  Of course this explanation begs the question as to why blue collar workers smoke more than their 
white-collar counterparts.
15.  Although it is not obvious why jobs or occupations that are more tolerant of smoking are also low wage 
growth.
16.  Standard wage equations, of course, only use the log speciﬁ  cation. The reason for this practice is the 
universal implementation of Mincer’s human capital earnings function. In the context of our paper, 
where what matters is the perception of wage increases, it is not evident a priori which measure of 
wage growth is more relevant. Therefore, we present evidence using both measures. In a previous 
version of the paper we also used nominal wages and its log counterpart and duplicated the same 
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17.  Although individuals are surveyed from 1979 to 1994 in the NLSY, they “enter” our sample only when 
they ﬁ  rst enter the labor market.
18.  If more future oriented individuals are more likely to work continuously, such a constraint might bias 
the sample.
19. We  deﬁ  ne a smoker as someone who smokes at least one cigarette per day on average. This deﬁ  nition 
is more or less comparable to the deﬁ  nition of “current smoker” used by the US Center for Disease 
Control.  See the data appendix for further details. As a comparison, Evans and Montgomery [1994] 
report 30% for the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), and 33% for the 1987 National 
Health Interview Survey (NHIS). Levine, Gustafson and Velenchik [1997], also using the NLSY, report 
smoking rates of 37% in 1984 and 29% 1991. 
20.  Although the detailed rankings of occupations by smoking has varied over the years [Nelson et al., 
1994], they are broadly similar to ours, where blue collar workers are at the top, and white collar 
workers are at the bottom, where teachers and sales representative have the lowest smoking rates 
[Bang and Kim, 2001].
21.  This is a well-documented ﬁ  nding (see Sander [1995]).
22.  The gap between “potential experience” (age-schooling-6) and “net” experience (actual years of employ-
ment) also reﬂ  ects the higher turnover and unemployment rates of smokers. 
23.  It is possible that individuals having health problems will select into jobs where their health problems 
do not limit their work, thus resulting in an underestimation of health problems due to smoking. We 
hope that the use of the word “could” in the survey instrument reduces such a problem. (See data 
appendix for the exact wording of the survey instrument.) For additional evidence on the health 
limitations of smoking on the job see Leigh [1985; 1986]. 
24.  If smoking is a proxy for discounting then our measure of wage growth may in fact underestimate 
the “effective” wage growth rate for non-smokers. Since non-smokers are more likely to have a Col-
lege degree and thus have considerably higher debt, their wages during the early part of careers will 
overstate their disposable income. Hence the “effective” wage growth differential between non-smokers 
and smokers is likely to be even higher than what is suggested by our measured wage growth differ-
ences. Similar considerations suggest that the “effective” ﬁ  rst wage differences between non-smokers 
and smokers will be smaller than the gross differences presented in Table 2. These considerations, 
however, are unlikely to lead to any ﬁ  rst order bias of our regression coefﬁ  cients since we control for 
completed years of schooling.
25.  These estimated differences in ﬁ  rst wages are likely to underestimate the true differences in levels 
of pre-labor market human capital between non-smokers and smokers if non-smokers are taking 
relatively higher initial wage reductions due to higher on-the-job investments. 
26.  The reason for including ﬁ  rst wage in the regressions is because equilibrium considerations of wage 
dynamics imply a trade-off between ﬁ  rst wage and wage growth. Equilibrium in the labor market 
implies that jobs with different wage growth rates will have comparable value. As a consequence, 
when a worker accepts a job she must pay for the option of high wage growth by accepting a lower 
initial wage. Hence these dynamic models of compensation imply a negative correlation between ﬁ  rst 
wage and wage growth, holding all other factors constant including the discount rate (see, for example, 
Munasinghe, 2000). Although we do not report the coefﬁ  cient estimates of ﬁ  rst wage here, across all 
our model speciﬁ  cations the estimated coefﬁ  cient of ﬁ  rst wage is negative as predicted (see Appendix 
Table 1). In addition, ﬁ  rst wage is likely to be an indicator for unobserved heterogeneity in skills, thus 
providing an additional control for heterogeneity across smokers and non-smokers.
27.  While some studies used the AFQT scores as a proxy for intelligence, others have argued that these 
scores reﬂ  ect mainly quality of schooling and skills learned during childhood.
28.  The AFQT score is a weighted mean of four test scores from the ten Armed Services Vocational Apti-
tude Battery (ASVAB) tests administered to the NLSY respondents in 1980 (See the data appendix 
for details). Replacing the AFQT score with the ten separate scores did not affect our results. 
29.  We also experimented with including an interaction between smoking and neighborhood income to 
test whether smoking may have an even more negative effect on wage growth among poorer house-
holds. Our estimates of this interaction effect were by and large insigniﬁ  cant. Perhaps, a more reﬁ  ned 
measure of household wealth may have lead to a different result.615 WHY DO DANCERS SMOKE?
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